

POLI 750 - Theories of International Relations I

Spring 2018

Instructor: Navin Bapat, 304 Hamilton Hall, 919.962.1438, email: bapat@unc.edu.

Time and Location: T 12.30-3.15 Graham Memorial 0212.

Office Hours: Th 1-4.

Introduction: The objectives of this course are:

1. To understand the scope and breadth of the theoretical literature that has defined the study of international relations.
1. To identify the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical paradigms represented in that literature.
2. To define specific research questions and issues that must be addressed by future research.
3. To prepare students for preliminary examinations in international relations.

It is, of course, impossible to provide a comprehensive review of the entire field of international relations in a single semester. The readings and discussions in this course seek to strike a balance between traditional works that define the evolution of the field and contemporary works that highlight the development of our knowledge and possible directions for future research. Some of the materials in this course rely on technical tools (such as econometrics or formal theory). Students are not expected to be familiar with these tools prior to enrolling in the course, but will become familiar with them during the semester.

Readings: The vast majority of readings from this course will come from journals in political science or international relations. The following books are required.

1. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. 2005. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press.
2. R. Harrison Wagner. 2007. *War and the State*. University of Michigan Press.

Grading: Your final grade in the course will be determined as follows:

Participation	20%
Response Papers	30%
Literature/Book Review	30%
Final Exam	20%

1. **Participation:** Students will be expected to come to class fully prepared to engage in a robust, informed discussion of the readings and the problems for the field of international relations raised by the readings.
2. **Response Papers:** In order to encourage active thinking about the readings and discussion in class, students will write five brief commentaries (3-4 pages, single-spaced) on the readings for a particular week. Students should seek in these notes to engage one or more themes in the works, discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and suggest future research questions facing that area of the literature. Students will sign up for their weeks at the first class meeting of the seminar. The papers will be circulated electronically to the entire class, and will be due at 9:00 a.m. on the relevant class day. Please do so by emailing the class participants, including me.
3. **Literature or Book Review:** The readings on this syllabus can only serve as a starting point from which students will engage additional important literature. Students will therefore write a literature or book review on a topic of interest to them that relates to one of the subjects addressed by this course. A book review will generally focus intensively on one or two related books; a literature review will examine the development of a theme or problem through time and a larger number of readings. Either type of analysis should be 4,000-5,000 words. Students should consult with me before selecting a review topic.

4. **Final Exam:** Students will take a one-day examination that will be patterned on the preliminary examinations that graduate students must pass before they may advance to the dissertation stage of the PhD program.

It is important that students cite the material that they have relied upon in writing these papers. If you have questions about when you need to provide citation for a source, please see the UNC guide on avoiding plagiarism. If you have questions about how to provide citation on your sources, please see the UNC Libraries' guide on citation formats. Use any citation format that you prefer, what is important is that you give credit to the sources you used.

Course Schedule and Reading List

January 16. The Core Problem in IR—The Causes of War and the Conditions for Peace.

1. Vasquez, Chapters 1-3.
2. Dina Zinnes. 1980. "Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher." *International Studies Quarterly* 23(3):315-42
3. Wagner, 1-2.
4. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 1985. Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View. *International Studies Quarterly* 29(2): 121-136.

January 23. (Neo)Realist Perspective

1. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 79-128, 161-193.
2. Stephen Walt. 1985. Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. *International Security* 9(4): 3-43.
3. John Vasquez. 1997. The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition. *American Political Science Review* 91(4): 899-912.
4. Daniel Nexon. 2009. The Balance of Power in the Balance. *World Politics* 61(2): 330-359.

January 30. Neo-Liberal Institutional Perspective

1. Keohane, Chapters 1, 7, 9.
2. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. *World Politics* 38(1):226-254.
3. David Lake. 2007. Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics. *International Security* 32(1): 47-79.
4. Daniel Bessner and Nicholas Guiholt. 2015. How Realism Waltzed Off: Liberalism and Decision-Making in Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism. *International Security* 40(2): 87-118.

February 6. Constructivist Perspectives

1. Alexander Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory. *International Organization* 41:335-370.
2. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization* 46:391-425.
3. James D. Fearon & David Laitin. 2000. Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity. *International Organization* 54(4): 845-877.

4. Brian Frederking, 2003. Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security. *The American Political Science Review* 97(3): 363-378.
5. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52(4): 887-917.

February 13. Feminist Perspectives.

1. Laura Sjoberg. 2012. What Waltz Couldn't See. *International Theory* 4(1): 1-38.
2. Laura Sjoberg, Kelly Kadera, & Cameron Thies. 2016. Reevaluating Gender and IR Scholarship: Moving Beyond Reiter's Dichotomies toward Effective Synergies. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
3. Cynthia Enloe. 2004. Good is Not Enough: The Need for a Feminist Consciousness. *International Affairs* 80(1): 95-97.
4. Mary Caprioli. 2004. Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis. *International Studies Review* 6(2).
5. J. Ann Tickner. 1997. You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and an IR Theorist. *International Studies Quarterly* 41(4): 611-632.

February 20. Rationalist Perspectives.

1. James Fearon. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.
2. Robert Powell. 2006. War as a Commitment Problem. *International Organization* 60(1):169-203.
3. Erik Gartzke. 1999. War is in the Error Term. *International Organization* 53(3): 567-587.

February 27. Bargaining and War.

1. Wagner, Chapters 2-5.
2. James Fearon. 2010. Comments on R. Harrison Wagner's War and the State: The Theory of International Politics. *International Theory* 2(2): 333-342.

March 6. Trust and Mistrust.

1. Robert Jervis. 1988. War and Misperception. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18(4): 675-700.
2. Allan Dafoe and Devin Coughy. 2016. Honor and War: Southern U.S. Presidents and the Effects of Concern for Reputation. *World Politics* 68(2): 341-348.
3. Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2013. In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries. *International Security* 38(1): 7-51.
4. Mark Crescenzi. 2007. Reputation and Interstate Conflict. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2): 382-396.
5. Andy Kydd. 2000. Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation. *International Organization* 54(2): 325-357.

March 13. Spring Break!

March 20. Institutions.

1. Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons. 2013. International Organizations and Institutions Handbook Chapter 13.
2. Hans Schmitz and Kathryn Sikkink. 2013. International Human Rights Handbook Chapter 33.
3. B. Ashley Leeds, Michaela Mattes and Jeremy S. Vogel. 2009. Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments. *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 461-476.

4. V. Page Fortna, 2003. Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace. *International Organization* 57(2): 337-372.
5. Sara Mitchell and Paul Hensel. 2007. International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements, *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 721-737.

March 27. Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy I.

1. Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, & Alastair Smith, *The Logic of Political Survival*.
2. James Fearon. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577-592.

April 3. Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy II.

1. Mike Tomz & Jessica Weeks. 2013. Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace. *American Political Science Review* 107(4): 849-865.
2. Jessica Weeks. 2012. Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict. *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 457-477.
3. Giacomo Chiozza & Hein Goemans. 2004. International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders. Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient? *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 604-619.
4. Sarah Croco. 2011. The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment. *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 457-477.
5. Michaela Mattes & Mariana Rodriguez. 2014. Autocracies and International Cooperation. *International Studies Quarterly* 58(3): 527-538

April 10. Economic Interdependence.

1. Kenneth Schultz. 2015. Borders, Conflict, and Trade. *Annual Review of Political Science* 18: 125-145.
2. John Oneal & Bruce Russett. 1999. Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 36(4): 423-442.
3. Tim Peterson. 2013. Dyadic Trade, Exit Costs, and Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(4): 564-591.
4. Mark Crescenzi. 2003. Economic Exit, Interdependence, and Conflict. *Journal of Politics* 65(3): 809-832.
5. Navin Bapat, Tobias Heinrich, Yoshi Kobayashi, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2013. Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis using New Data. *International Interactions* 39(1): 79-98.
6. Navin Bapat and Bo Ram Kwon. 2015. When are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework. *International Organization* 69(1): 131-162.
7. T. Clifton Morgan. 2015. Hearing the Noise: Economic Sanctions Theory and Anomalous Evidence. *International Interactions* 41(4): 744-754.

April 17. Civil wars. Macro Analysis.

1. Barbara Walter, 2009. Bargaining Failures and Civil War. *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 243-261.
2. James Fearon & David Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90.
3. Stephen Gent, 2008. Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts. *International Studies Quarterly* 52(4):713-735.

4. V. Page Fortna. 2004. Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War. *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2): 269-292.
5. Isak Svensson. 2009. Who Brings Which Peace? Neutral versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(3): 446-449.
6. Navin Bapat. 2017. *Monsters to Destroy: Understanding the War on Terror*. Chapter 3.

April 24. Terrorism and the Microfoundations of Rebellion.

1. Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge.
2. Stathis Kalyvas. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge.
3. Erica Chenoweth. 2013. Terrorism and Democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science* 16: 355-378.
4. Navin Bapat and Sean Zeigler. 2016. Terrorism, Dynamic Commitment Problems, and Military Conflict. *American Journal of Political Science* 60(2): 337-351.