

POLI 753 - Theories of International Conflict and Cooperation

A.K.A. Seminar on Bargaining Models

Fall 2015

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Time and Location: Tu 2-5 0024 Cobb Hall.

Office Hours: Th 1-4 or by appointment.

Introduction: Political actors frequently resolve their conflicts through bargaining of some form, and the use of other means of resolving conflicts, such as strikes, war, or economic sanctions, suggests the failure of the bargaining process. The observation that political actors frequently attempt to resolve their conflicts through bargaining indicates that political science may require an understanding of the bargaining process and bargaining behavior. This seminar involves a theoretical analysis of negotiation in political science. We will undertake a critical analysis of numerous bargaining models and the empirical research designed to test their propositions. The goals of the seminar are to survey the bargaining literature, learn about some of the benefits of the modeling approach, construct our own models, and discuss how to best test the empirical implications of these models.

Readings: There is one textbook for this course:

Andrew H. Kydd. 2015. *International Relations Theory: The Game-Theoretic Approach*. Cambridge.

The textbook presents a discussion of some of the key topics in the bargaining literature. Since it is very recent, you'll have to purchase it on your own. The rest of readings from this course will come from journals in political science or economics. All of the articles will be available through Sakai. The reading list each week is somewhat limited (which means that there is more out there for you to survey on your own). Keeping the reading list small will allow us to have a more in depth about the models. Although the classes will involve discussion, I will also be doing more lecturing early in the semester as we go through the nuts and bolts of the models. This dynamic will change as we move forward.

I am assuming that most of you have some basic familiarity with game theory. However, I am assuming that everyone will benefit from an introduction/refresher. My intention is to therefore go slowly through the material to help everyone along. If you are less familiar with game theory, I would recommend taking a look at the following texts as overviews:

1. Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, and Randal C. Picker. 1994. *Game Theory and the Law*. Harvard.
2. James Morrow. 1994. *Game Theory for Political Scientists*. Princeton.
3. Ken Binmore. 1992. *Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory*. Michigan.
4. Martin J. Osborne .2004. *Introduction to Game Theory*. Oxford.
5. Nolan McCarthy and Adam Meirowitz. 2006. *Political Game Theory*. Cambridge.

Grading: Your final grade in the course will be determined as follows:

Participation	30%
Memos	20%
Final Paper	50%

1. **Participation:** Each member of the seminar is expected to complete all the required reading prior to each class meeting and contribute to class discussions. The material presented will be challenging. We will rely heavily on each other to get the most out of the readings. Your individual contributions, as well as the quality of the group discussion for each week, will be factored into your participation grade.

2. **Response Memo:** In order to encourage active thinking about the readings and discussion in class, students will write two brief commentaries (3-4 pages, single-spaced) on the readings for a particular week. Students should seek in these notes to engage one or more themes in the works, discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and suggest future research questions facing that area of the literature. Students will sign up for their weeks at the first class meeting of the seminar. The papers will be circulated electronically to the entire class, and will be due at 9:00 a.m. on the relevant class day. Please do so by emailing the class participants, including me. Students that write for a particular week will be expected to take a more active role in the discussions. Failure to submit memos and/or participate in your role in the discussion will be greeted with ill-humor.

3. **Final Paper:** The major course requirement is a research paper that can address any topic in political science, provided that it relates to bargaining theory and has my approval. It must present original research (not just summaries of old research) and make a new contribution. This contribution can be a formal bargaining model, theoretical framework, or can test propositions from the bargaining literature. The main goal is to get you to build this paper into your research agenda, including beyond this class. That is, this could be the start of a dissertation or turn into a publishable paper. Since I want you to enjoy working on this project, I am very flexible with your topic choice. I would encourage you to talk to me early and often, though this semester, I will probably be most available via email. In addition to writing the papers, all of you will present your research to the class during the final two weeks. I will assign each of you one or two papers from your peers for you to review prior to the presentation. At this point, the paper does not need to be complete, but you should have enough for one of your peers to make comments on your work. This is designed to be constructive and helpful to the presenter prior to turning in your final paper. Non-constructive comments will be greeted with ill-humor. Papers will be due on **December 5**. Late papers will also be greeted with very ill-humor.

Course Schedule and Reading List

August 18. Introduction.

1. Kydd, Ch. 1, 2.
2. Roger Fisher and William Ury. 1983. *Getting to Yes. Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*. New York: Penguin Books. <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/fish7513.htm>

August 25. Formal Approaches to Bargaining.

1. Kydd, pp. 55-66.
2. John F. Nash. 1950. The Bargaining Problem. *Econometrica* 18(2): 155-162.
3. Ariel Rubinstein. 1982. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. *Econometrica* 50(1): 97-110.

Recommended.

1. R. Harrison Wagner. 1999. Bargaining and Conflict Management. *Manuscript*.
2. Robert Gibbons. 1997. An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 11(1): 127-149.
3. Abhinav Muthoo. 2000. A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory. *World Economics* 1(2): 145-166.

September 1. Outside Options.

1. Kydd, pp. 66-74.
2. Thomas C. Schelling. 1956. An Essay on Bargaining. *American Economic Review* 46(3): 281-306.
3. James D. Fearon. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.

4. Erik Gartzke. 1999. War is in the Error Term. *International Organization* 53(3): 567-587.

Recommended.

1. Dan Reiter. 2003. Exploring the Bargaining Model of War. *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1): 27-43.

September 8. Incomplete Information.

1. Kydd, Ch. 6.

2. Navin A. Bapat, Luis de la Calle, Kaisa Hinkkainen, and Elena McClean. 2016. Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent. *Journal of Politics*, forthcoming.

3. Mark Fey & Kristopher K. Ramsay. 2007. Mutual Optimism and War. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 738-754. Scan.

4. Branislav Slantchev & Ahmer Tarar. 2010. Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War. *American Journal of Political Science* 55(1): 135-148. Scan.

Recommended.

1. Robert Powell. 1988. Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information. *American Political Science Review* 82(1): 155-178.

2. R. Harrison Wagner. 1994. Peace, War, and the Balance of Power. *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 593-607.

September 15. Signaling and Communication.

1. Kydd, Ch. 9.

2. James D. Fearon. 1997. Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(1): 68-90.

3. Branislav Slantchev. 2010. Feigning Weakness. *International Organization* 64(3): 357-388.

4. Scott Wolford. 2014. Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining. *American Journal of Political Science* 58(1): 144-156.

Recommended

1. Brett Ashley Leeds. 2003. Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes. *American Journal of Political Science* 47(3): 427-439.

2. James D. Morrow. 2000. Alliances: Why Write Them Down? *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 63-83.

3. R. Harrison Wagner. 2000. Bargaining, War, and Alliances. Typescript, University of Texas.

September 22. Bargaining with an Audience.

1. Kydd, Ch. 11.

2. Robert D. Putnam. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization* 42(3): 427-460. (Skim - just get the basic idea).

3. James D. Fearon. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577-592. (Skim - just get the basic idea).

4. Kenneth Schultz. 1998. Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises. *American Political Science Review* 87(1): 115-132.

5. William Spaniel and Bradley K. Smith. 2015. Sanctions, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure. *International Studies Quarterly*, forthcoming.

Recommended:

1. James D. Fearon. 1998. Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: pp. 289-313.
2. Ahmer Tarar. 2001. International Bargaining with Two Sided Constraints. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(3): 320-340.
3. Branislav Slantchev. 2006. Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs. *International Studies Quarterly* 50(2): 445-477.

September 29. Bargaining in Conflict.

1. Alastair Smith. 1998. Fighting Battles, Winning Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(3): 301-320.
2. R. Harrison Wagner. 2000. Bargaining and War. *American Journal of Political Science* 44(3): 469-484.
3. Darren Filson & Suzanne Werner. 2002. A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War. *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 819-838.
4. Branislav Slantchev. 2004. How Initiations End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace. *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 313-330

Recommended.

1. Branislav Slantchev. 2003. The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States. *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 123-133.
2. Branislav Slantchev. 2004. How Initiations End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace. *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 313-330.
3. Darren Filson & Suzanne Werner. 2004. Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes. *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 296-313.
4. Branislav Slantchev. 2002. Markov Perfect Equilibrium in a Stochastic Bargaining Model. Typescript, University of California - San Diego.

October 6. Commitment Problems and Shifts in Power.

1. Kydd, Ch. 5.
2. Robert Powell. 2006. War as a Commitment Problem. *International Organization* 60(1): 169-203.
3. Alexandre Debs & Nuno P. Monteiro. 2013. Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War. *International Organization*, Forthcoming.

Recommended.

1. Robert Powell. 2004. The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information. *American Political Science Review* 98(2): 231-241.
2. Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge.
3. Stathis Kalyvas. 2000. Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties. *Comparative Politics* 32(4): 379-398.

October 13. Bargaining Failure due to the Cost of Peace.

1. Kydd, Ch. 7.
2. Branislav Slantchev. 2005. Military Coercion in Interstate Crises. *The American Political Science Review* 99(4): 533-547.
3. Branislav Slantchev. 2012. Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms. 106(4): 787-809.

4. Robert Powell. 2012. Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power. *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 620-637.

October 20. Conflict over Future Sources of Power.

1. James Fearon. 1996. Bargaining over Objects that Influence Future Power. Typescript, Stanford University.
2. Curtis Bell and Scott Wolford. 2014. Oil Discoveries, Shifting Power, and Civil Conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*.
3. Thomas Chadeaux. 2011. Bargaining over Power: When do Shifts in Power lead to War? *International Theory* 3(2): 228-253.

October 27. Intervention and Enforcement.

1. Andrew Kydd. 2003. Whose Side are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation. *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 597-611.
2. Kenneth Schultz. 2010. The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars. *International Organization* 64(2): 281-312.
3. Navin Bapat. 2006. State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups. *International Studies Quarterly* 50(1): 213-230.
4. Navin Bapat. 2015. *In Search of Monsters to Destroy: An Analysis of the War on Terror and its Future*. Ch. 3-4.

Recommended:

1. Andrew Kydd & Barbara F. Walter. 2003. Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence. *International Organization* 56(2): 263-296.
2. Suzanne Werner. 1999. The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms. *American Journal of Political Science* 43(3): 912-934.
3. V. Paige Fortna. 2004. Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War. *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2): 269-292.
4. Carolina Hartzell & Matthew Hoddie. 2003. Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management. *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 318-332.

November 3. Institutions and Multilateral Bargaining.

1. Kydd, Ch. 10.
2. James D. Fearon. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization* 52(2): 269-306.
3. George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? *International Organization* 50(3): 379-406
4. Barbara Koremenos. 2005. Contracting around International Uncertainty. *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 549-565.

November 10. Challenges to Bargaining Theory.

1. Jonathan Mercer. 2013. Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War. *International Organization* 67(2): 221-252.
2. Scott de Marchi and Scott Page. 2008. Computational and Agent Based Models in *Oxford Handbook of Political Science Methodology*.

3. David A. Lake. 2010. Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War. *International Security* 35(3): 7-52.

November 17. First Round Presentations.

November 24. Research Day.

December 1. Second Round Presentations.